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Kiseido Reprints of Two Important Go Classics

The 1971 Honinbo Tournament

by Iwamoto Kaoru

In November 1970, an unheralded 21-year-old 7-dan won his way into the Honinbo league. There, over the next 6 months, he beat some of the strongest go players in the world to earn the right to challenge Rin Kaiho for the Honinbo title.

At that time, Rin was the undisputed king of the go world. He had convincingly stripped the great Sakata Eio of his Meijin and Honinbo titles, and he had rebuffed him in his challenges to get them back. Rin was being billed as Go Seigen's successor and no one gave Ishida Yoshio much of a chance.

But Ishida was one of a new breed of players from that hot-house of go prodigies known as the Kitani Dojo. He was almost invincible and rarely lost a game — he had run up a string of 30 straight victories in the ranking tournament; he was a calm player, especially under pressure; he possessed superb positional judgment; and his endgame calculation was so accurate that he earned

the nickname 'the computer'. Rin was also noted for these same abilities, but Ishida was a level higher.

The 1971 Honinbo Tournament chronicles Ishida's first major triumph. It starts with his win in the final preliminary tournament which earned him the right to play in the Honinbo league. It then analyzes all seven of his games in the league, and the six games in the title match. Every game is analyzed in great detail, with easy-to-follow figures for each game.

The book was written by James Davies, based on the commentaries of Iwamoto Kaoru 9-dan who had held the Honinbo title for two terms from 1945 to 1950. Out of print for more than 20 years, it will be a welcome addition to the libraries of those players who are looking for in-depth game commentaries.

Price: US\$15.00 plus shipping & handling. 208 pages.

Positional Judgment

High-Speed Game Analysis

by Cho Chikun, Kisei, Meijin and Honinbo

This book aims to show you how to use your intuition to make accurate large-scale judgments at a glance. It illuminates a long neglected but essential part of go: estimation of the territorial prospects of each player at key stages throughout the game. If you fail to do this, vital moves will be overlooked and you will never become a truly strong player. In addition, your estimation must be accurate enough to make important strate-

gic decisions: should you defend or should you invade, should you attack aggressively or should you try to wind up the game quickly? If you can't assess accurately the balance of territories and calculate whether you are ahead or behind, you will lack the information that is the key prerequisite for making such decisions.

Price US\$15.00 plus shipping & handling. 192 pages.

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CONTENTS

Go World News	2
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Korean Tournaments

The 38th Top Position Title Match — Game Two: Lee Chang-ho vs. Ahn Cho-young	7
The 5th Pae-dal Wangki — Game Five: Lee Chang-ho vs. Yoo Chang-hyuk	8
The 10th Kisung Title Match — Game One: Lee Chang-ho vs. Mok Jin-seuk	9

Chinese Tournaments

The Robert's Cup: Chang Hao vs. Yang Shihai	11
The 6th King of the New Stars: Qiu Jun vs. Hu Yueyu	12

International Tournaments

The Spring Orchid Cup — Round Two: Chang Hao vs. Mok Jin-seuk	13
The 3rd Samsung Cup Final: Lee Chang-ho vs. Ma Xiaochun	15
Game One	15
Game Five	16

A Fighting Art	20
1. Qiu Jun vs. Kong Jie	20
2. The life-and-death problem that was too much for Sakai 9-dan	21

Japanese Title Matches

The 23rd Meijin Title Match: Cho Chikun vs. O Rissei	23
Game One	23
Game Two	24
Game Three	26
Game Four	29
Game Five	30
Game Six	32
Game Seven	34

From 20-kyu to Shodan: Basic Knowledge for Becoming a Dan-Level Player

Michael Redmond on the Opening	39
Making Good Shape	44
Endgame Problems on 5x5 Boards (4)	53
Four Endgame Problems on 9x9 Boards	56
An Introduction to Basic Josekis (4)	60

The Cover: 'A Burlesque of Kibi and the Chinese Minister'. Oban diptych by Kuniyoshi, published by Daikokuya Kinnosuke in 1856. See page 51 for the story. (From the collection of John Power.)

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Note: Japanese, Chinese, and Korean names are given with the family name first. The Pinyin romanization system is used for mainland Chinese names.

Go World News

International Tournaments

The 12th Fujitsu Cup

The first two rounds of the 12th Fujitsu Cup, jointly sponsored by the computer maker Fujitsu and the Yomiuri Newspaper, were held on April 10 and 12 at the Japan Go Association in Tokyo.

The Japanese pros dominated the first five years of this tournament, but in the next four years South Korean players won three Cups and China one. Then in 1997 Kobayashi Koichi scored another win for Japan, but last year Lee Chang-ho came back to take the Cup again.

As always, 24 players from all over the world came to Japan to take part in the tournament. Japan and Korea both fielded seven players and China six. Taiwan, Europe, North America and South America each had one representative.

The most noteworthy victory in the first round was the North American representative Jimmy Cha's defeat of Ishii Shinzo 9-dan of Japan. Cha, who is well known to our readers, is originally from South Korea where he studied to be a professional player. He reached 4-dan in 1984, at which time he moved to the United States. This was his sixth appearance in this tournament. Although he

has never made it past the quarterfinals, he has defeated a number of strong players over the years, most notably Cho Chikun in 1990. In the second round this year, he lost to Ishida Yoshio. Ishida, whose nickname is 'the computer', lived up to this moniker by playing a subtle endgame sequence that enabled him to win by $5\frac{1}{2}$ points.

The second round, in which the seeded players joined the tournament, saw two big upsets. Last year's champion Lee Chang-ho lost to Kato Masao, and last year's runner up, Chang Hao, went down to defeat at the hands of Lee Sang-jae, a 21-year-old rising star from South Korea who happens to be the nephew of the great Cho Chikun.

Cho Chikun was also seeded into the second round. In his game against Wang Lei from China, Cho lost a large group. All the pros watching the game quickly lost interest, considering Cho's position hopeless. But then Cho came to life and played the power go that only he is capable of. He simultaneously attacked two of Wang's groups that seemed absolutely alive. As the attack developed, interest in the game revived and everyone was flabbergasted when Cho managed to kill one of those groups. This was undoubtedly the most incredible game of the tournament so far.



Lee Sang-jae of Korea on his way to defeating China's number one, Chang Hao.



*The 16-year-old Chinese prodigy Qiu Jun makes a move
against his opponent Chou Chunhsu of Taiwan.*

One player to watch in this tournament is Qiu Jun, a 4-dan from China. Last September he won the 1998 Chinese Go Championship (one of his games in that tournament is given on page 39 in GW84). At 16, he is the youngest player ever to have won a major title in China. His go is brilliant and original. It features sharp tactics and he is not afraid to take chances. For this reason, his games always create a sensation. He was seeded in the first round and earned his way into the quarterfinals by defeating the Taiwan representative Chou Chunhsu.

Four Japanese players, all of whom hold or have held top titles, made it into the quarterfinals, which will be held on June 5. Both China and Korea are left with two players each. The pairings are:

Kato Masao vs. Ma Xiaochun (China)
Kobayashi Satoru vs. Lee Sang-jae (Korea)
Ishida Yoshio vs. Yoo Chang-hyuk (Korea)
Cho Chikun vs. Qiu Jun (China)

The 1st Chunlan (Spring Orchid) Cup

The quarterfinals of the Spring Orchid Cup were played in Beijing on April 21, 1999. The only two Nihon Ki-in players remaining, Yoda Norimoto and O Rissei, were eliminated. Although this is a Chinese tournament, Chang Hao is the only Chinese player remaining, with the other two semifinal places going

to Korea. The results in the quarterfinals were:

Choi Myung-hoon (Korea) beat O Rissei

Lee Chang-ho (Korea) beat Yoda Norimoto

Chang Hao beat Yoo Chang-hyuk (Korea)

Cho Hoon-hyun (Korea) beat Zhou Heyang (China)

The semifinals will be held on May 21 in Seoul. Choi Myung-hoon will play Lee Chang-ho and Chang Hao will play Cho Hoon-hyun.

The 3rd LG Cup

For the second time this year Lee Chang-ho and Ma Xiaochun faced each other in the final of an international tournament, this time in the LG Cup. In February, Lee defeated Ma 3-2 in the Samsung Cup final.

The LG Cup match started out badly for Ma, with Lee winning the first two games (played on March 2 and 3). The last three games of the match were scheduled to be played on May 10 to 14, but a two-game deficit against a player of Lee's caliber in a best-of-five match is a huge handicap for any player, even one as strong as Ma. In addition, Ma's record against Lee in past tournaments has not been very good. As it turned out, Lee won the third game, thereby winning the Cup. This is the fourth consecutive international tournament that Lee has won in less

than a year. His run began on May 13 last year when he defeated his compatriot Yoo Chang-hyuk 3-1 in the Tong Yang Securities Cup Final. He then defeated Chang Hao in the Fujitsu Cup final in August, and defeated Ma 3-2 in the Samsung Cup. By winning the the LG Cup final, Lee has produced the first 'Grand Slam' on the international circuit.

News from Japan

The Kisei Title Match

By defeating Kobayashi Koichi for the second time in a little more than a year, Cho Chikun has proved again that he has no equal in the Japanese go world. Going into the sixth game of this match Cho was ahead 3-2. Cho started out with a good opening, but, in the transition between the opening and middle game, he made a strategic mistake that enabled Kobayashi to take the initiative and to build up a large moyo. Cho fought back fiercely and invaded. Kobayashi went after the invading group, and in the complicated fight that ensued, Cho did what he does best — making life for an endangered group. Not only did his huge group live, he skillfully played so that it lived in sente and he used it to take a large profit in the center. This game was an impressive display of Cho's power and showed why he has remained the triple-crown champion for so long.

Kobayashi was clearly Cho's most dangerous challenger. But by beating him in their last three best-of-seven encounters, Cho has left no doubt in anyone's mind that he is the number-one player in Japan. The results of the match:

Game 1: Jan. 13 & 14, 1999. Kobayashi resigned.

Game 2: Jan. 27 & 28. Kobayashi resigned.

Game 3: Feb. 3 & 4. Cho resigned.

Game 4: Feb. 17 & 18. Cho by 1½ points.

Game 5: Feb. 24 & 25. Cho resigned.

Game 6: Mar. 10 & 11. Cho by 5½ points.

The Judan Title Match

Kobayashi may have faltered in his quest to regain the Kisei title he once held for eight straight terms, but, after taking the Tengen title in December last year, he showed he was still on the comeback trail by taking the Judan title from Hikosaka Naoto.

Late last year, Kobayashi remarried and this seems to have reinvigorated his game, as shown by his success in winning two major titles and also getting the right to challenge Cho for the Kisei title. In contrast to the struggle he had winning the Tengen title from Kudo Norio (see GW84), Kobayashi had an easy time defeating the Judan title holder Hikosaka Naoto by winning three straight games in this best-of-five title match.

This is not the first time that Kobayashi has held the Judan title. In 1984, he defeated Kato Masao and held the title for three consecutive terms. But Kato came back as the challenger three years later and dethroned him.

Winning the Judan title was not Kobayashi's only success this year. On March 6 he also won the NEC Cup. With its ¥15,000,000 first prize, it is worth more than the Judan, Tengen, and Oza titles (each worth around ¥10,000,000), so this must be counted as another major achievement.

The fact that Hikosaka won the Judan title last year was a surprise. At 37, he is certainly among the top Japanese players, but he is not considered in the same league as some of the stars of Japanese go. Still, he had good results last year, became the Judan challenger by beating Cho Chikun, then went on to beat the great Kato Masao (who has won more than 40 titles) in the title match to take his first-ever title. He also did very well in this year's Honinbo league and just missed becoming the challenger for the title.

The 54th Honinbo League

Cho Sonjin to challenge for the title

In this year's Honinbo league, both Hikosaka Naoto and Cho Sonjin ended with top 5-2 scores. This necessitated a playoff, and it was Cho who emerged the victor when Hikosaka resigned after 219 moves.

As often happens in the Honinbo league, four players went into the final round tied for the lead with four wins to two losses. They were Hikosaka, Cho, Ishida Akira, and Ryu Shikun. Since Hikosaka was ranked third in this league, he was guaranteed a place in next year's league. However, the three others were ranked at the bottom, so losing meant that they would be dropped from the league. But winning could give them a chance at becom-

The 54th Honinbo League. Title Holder: Cho Chikun

Rank		OR	OM	HN	KS	YK	IA	CS	RS	Won	Lost
1	O Rissei		○	○	○	●	○	●	●	4	3
2	O Meien	●		●	●	●	●	●	○	1	6
3	Hikosaka Naoto	●	○		○	○	○	○	●	5	2
4	Kobayashi Satoru	●	○	●		●	●	●	●	1	6
5	Yamada Kimio	○	○	●	○		●	○	●	4	3
5	Ishida Akira	●	○	●	○	○		●	○	4	3
5	Cho Sonjin	○	○	●	○	●	○		○	5	2
5	Ryu Shikun	○	●	○	○	○	●	●		4	3

ing the challenger. The lucky one turned out to be Cho. In the last round, he was pitted against Ryu Shikun 7-dan and Hikosaka against Ishida Akira. Cho beat Ryu and Hikosaka beat Ishida.

O Rissei, who challenged Cho for the Honinbo title last year, ended with what was for him a so-so score of 4-3, while O Meien, who was in last year's playoff, ended with a dismal 1-6 record, as did Kobayashi Satoru. A playoff for the players to be dropped from the league was also necessary. In the first game Ryu beat Ishida, but then Yamada Kimio beat Ryu, so Yamada retained his place in the league while Ryu and Ishida, along with O Meien and Kobayashi were dropped.

Just like Cho Chikun, Cho Sonjin was born in South Korea. He is 29 years old and he came to Japan to study go when he was 12. This was his second appearance in the league. He has won two titles, the Shinjin-O in 1991 and the Shin'ei Tournament in 1992, but this will be

his first challenge for a major title. No one gives him much of a chance against Cho Chikun, but it would not be the first time that an unheralded player has upset the champion. One need only go back five years to when Kobayashi Satoru surprised everyone by taking the Kisei title from Cho. Nobody thought that Satoru was in Cho's league, but he played in three successive Kisei title matches. Certainly, the Honinbo must not be complacent; if he does not take his young opponent seriously, the underdog's determination could prove to be his undoing.

In an interview after the playoff game, Cho said that he was overjoyed to have become the Honinbo challenger and promised to do his best and to play some beautiful games. The first game of the match will be played on May 12 and 13.

The 23rd Meijin League

At the half way point, Yoda Norimoto is

The 24th Meijin League. Title Holder: Cho Chikun

Rank		OR	KM	YN	KK	RS	TM	KS	MT	SM	Won	Lost
1	O Rissei			●			○	○	○	○	4	1
2	Kato Masao			●	●	●	○		○	○	3	3
3	Yoda Norimoto	○	○			○		○		○	5	0
4	Kobayashi Koichi		○			●		○	○	●	3	2
5	Ryu Shikun		○	●	○		○	○		○	5	1
6	Takemiya Masaki	●	●			●			●	○	1	4
7	Kobayashi Satoru	●		●	●	●			○		1	4
7	Mimura Tomoyasu	●	●		●		○	●			1	4
7	Sakai Maki	●	●	●	○	●	●				1	5

leading the league. Yoda and O Rissei were tied at 4-0, but in their game on May 6 Yoda beat O. Last year, Yoda lost to O, then faltered at the end, while O won all of his games to become the Meijin challenger. Will the same pattern repeat itself with Yoda becoming the challenger. Waiting in the wings, in case Yoda slips up, is Ryu Shikun with a 5-1 score, while Kobayashi Koichi is still in contention with three wins against two losses. All the other players have three losses or more, so they seem to be out of the running.

The 46th NHK Cup

For the second year in a row, Yoda Norimoto has won the prestigious NHK Cup. This cup is a 50-player lightning go tournament, the games of which are broadcast every Sunday from 12:20 to 2:00 pm on NHK, the government-backed educational television station. Yoda has made quite a reputation as a speed player by winning this tournament again. His win last year gave him the right to play in the Asia TV Cup, which he won by defeating Ma Xiaochun in the final.

Yoda is the second player in the history of this tournament to have won it two years in a row. The other player was Sakata Eio, but Yoda still has quite a way to go to match Sakata, for latter won the NHK Cup three years in a row from 1957-59. Sakata also won it two successive years in 1961-62, 1965-66, and 1976-77. Altogether, Sakata has won this tournament 11 times. Still Yoda is only 33 years old and, if he is after Sakata's record, he has a head start because Sakata was 37 when he won his first NHK Cup. Moreover, Yoda seems to be positioned to be Japan's top player in the post-Cho era, whenever that might occur.

Yoda's opponent in the final round was Tono Hiroaki, a 59-year-old veteran player from the Kansai Ki-in. He is no stranger to this tournament, having won it in 1979, but this time he was no match for Yoda.

News from China

The 1st Kisei Title Match

Chang Hao vs. Ma Xiaochun

In the final 16-player section of this new title, played from December 15 to January 24, Ma Xiaochun and Chang Hao won their way to the final and will play a best-of-seven match

to determine the first Chinese Kisei. The first two games were played in the middle of March, with each player winning a game.

The 13th Tianyuan Title Match

Chang Hao defends the Tengen title.

In this year's Tianyuan (Tengen) title match, held from March 25-31, Chang Hao beat Liu Xiaoguang 3-1 to defend his title for the third consecutive year.

King of the New Stars Tournament

The King of the New Stars tournament (equivalent to the Shinjin-O tournament in Japan) was held from March 2-8. This tournament is restricted to players 30 years old and below 7-dan. Hu Yueyu 5-dan and Qiu Jun 4-dan reached the final and played a best-of-three match. After splitting the first two games, Hu won the third game and the title. This game is presented on page 12.

The 2nd Robert's Cup

This tournament, sponsored by the Robert's Milk Company, was won by Chang Hao for the second year in a row. The challenger this year was Yang Shihai 8-dan. The best-of-five title match was held from January 19 to 28, with Chang Hao forcing his opponent to resign in all three games. The third game is presented on page 11.

China's number one marries number ten.

In January this year, Chang Hao, the top-ranked Chinese player, married the number ten ranked Chinese pro Zhang Xuan.

News from Korea

Rui Naiwei to play in Korea

Rui Naiwei, the world's strongest woman player, and her husband Jiang Zhujiu have become guest members of the Korean Go Association. Both players seem to have fallen out of favor with the Chinese Go Association and have been wandering in the go wilderness for the last decade. Rui is clearly one of the top players in the world, so this could be her chance to play against some powerful competition, such as Lee Chang-ho and other young Korean superstars.

More news on page 51

Korean Tournaments

The 38th Top Position Title Match Game Two

This title, called Chaigowi in Korean, has been held by Lee Chang-ho for five terms. This year the challenger was Ahn Cho-young, a 19-year-old 5-dan. Ahn has been appearing in the late stages of many international tournaments, such as the Samsung Cup, the LG Cup, and the Fujitsu Cup. As expected, Lee won this best-of-three match, but Ahn played well in Game Two. He had the lead throughout and should have won, but Lee outplayed him in the endgame and eked out a half-point win.

White: Lee Chang-ho

Black: Ahn Cho-young 5-dan

Komi: 5½ points; time: 4 hours each.

Played on March 27, 1999.

Commentary by Kim In 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50)

Instead of 12, jumping to White A would not be interesting. Black would answer with 12 and White would slide to B.

Extending to Black 23 is the simple way to play.

Black should invade at C with 31.

Black 43 is the proper move. If Black tries to destroy White's eye space with a placement at D, White will push in at 43 and cut. Black's position would fall apart.

In response to Black 45, the sequence from White 46 to 50 is a relaxed way of defending the territory at the bottom.

Figure 2 (51-100)

Confining White with 51 and 53 gives Black the advantage.

Black 55 and 61 are good moves.

Black 63 is a thick move, but jumping in to 65 would have firmly established Black's lead.




Figure 2 (51-100)




Figure 3 (101-150)

Figure 3 (101-150)

After Black defends with 9, he is still in the lead. But with the sequence from White 12 to 22 and 28, Lee turns on the pressure.




Figure 4 (151-228)

White 128: connects at the marked stone

Figure 4 (151-228)

Black 69 should be at 70. This would have established Black's lead.

Black 91 and 95 should be at A.

Black 99 was the losing move. Had Black played at 102 instead, he would have won.

White wins by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.

The 6th Pae-dal Wangki Game Five

Yoo Chang-hyuk has been without a title for some time, but he rectified this situation by defeating Lee Chang-ho in the fifth game of the Pae-dal Wangki title match. We present this game in which Yoo completely dominates his illustrious opponent.

White: Lee Chang-ho

Black: Yoo Chang-hyuk

Komi: $5\frac{1}{2}$ points; time 3 hours each.

Played on December 21, 1998.

Figure 1 (1-50)

White 20 looks a bit narrow, but it can't be said that White has made any mistakes.

The sequence from White 32 to 38 indicates that Lee intends to win in the endgame. However, it may have been too excessive to have allowed the extension of Black 39.

Countering the attachment of White 42 with Black 43 showed fighting spirit. Black

could have also played at A instead.

Black 47 and 49 are strong attacking moves, typical of Yoo.




Figure 1 (1-50)




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100)

When White played 58, he had a feeling of relief, but Black 59 violently attacks White's position, and the struggle becomes even more intense when Black extends to 67.

Instead of 84, White might try to capture the five black stones in the center by connecting at A. However, after the sequence Black 97-White B-Black C-White 99, Black will attach at D and White will lose.

When Black extends to 85, White finds himself in a difficult position.

White secures his stones with 96, but Black has the advantage after he plays 97 and 99.

Figure 3 (101–150)

White struggles on with the sequence from 2 to 20, but when Black plays the vital point of 39, White is still in dire straits.

Black 43 is also a vital point.

Black starts a ko with 45. He has abundant ko threats.




Figure 3 (101–150)
36: at 30; 37: at 32; 49: at 45




Figure 4 (151–200)
59, 65, 71, 79, 85, 91, 97: at the marked stone;
62, 68, 76, 82, 88, 94, 100: at 56

Figure 5 (201–250)

White ignores Black 13 and resolves the ko by capturing with 14. White could continue the ko by making a threat at A with 14.

Black continues his attack with 15.
Black wins by 7½ points.




Figure 5 (201–250)
6, 12: at the marked stone; 9: at 3




Figure 6 (251–314)
100: at the triangled stone;
114: at the squared stone

The 10th Kisung Title Match Game One

Unlike the Japanese Kisei title, the Korean equivalent, the Kisung title, is not the most prestigious nor the most lucrative. The title match used to be a best-of-seven affair, but it has been reduced to a best-of-three. This year's challenger was the 18-year-old Mok Jin-seuk 4-dan, one of the many rising stars in Korean go. Of course Lee again proved to be

too strong for this ambitious young player and he took the series with two straight wins to hold this title for seven consecutive terms.

White: Mok Jin-seuk 4-dan

Black: Lee Chang-ho

Played on January 7, 1999




Figure 1 (1-40)

Figure 1 (1-40)

White 18 is an ambitious move.

Instead of White 28, White should play the sequence White 30-Black 28-White A-Black B-White C, giving White profit on the left.

White 32 is too tight. White 35-Black D-White E is the sequence White should play. White's moves here were too ambitious.




Figure 2 (41-79)

Figure 2 (41-79)

White 42 was premature. White still has time to play A before making this move. If Black defends at 42, White can strengthen his position on the right with B and take the lead.

White 50 and 58 are typical of Mok's style, but Lee answers with composure by playing Black 59, 61, and 65.

White 72 was the losing move. Black launches a sharp attack with the sequence from 73 to 79.




Figure 3 (80-119)

Figure 3 (80-119)

White 82, along with 88, keeps the black stones from linking up along the bottom, but White 84 and 86 were careless and sealed Mok's defeat. White should have played the sequence White A-Black B-White 103-Black C. He could then cut at 100. If White is going to win, he must take this kind of decisive action.

White cuts at 100, then lives at the bottom with the sequence to 112. However, Black plays 113 and White's prospects for territory on the right side have been dashed.

White resigns after Black 119.

Chinese Tournaments

The Robert's Cup

The Robert's Cup is a new tournament sponsored by the Robert Milk Company. The final is a best-of-five match. Chang Hao won this year's cup for the second year in a row by beating Yang Shihai 3-0.

White: Yang Shihai 8-dan

Black: Chang Hao 8-dan

Komi 5½ points.

Played in Beijing on January 28, 1999.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50)

Instead of White 42, the knight's move at 44 would be more appropriate.

The peep of Black 45 is severe. White has no good response.

Figure 2 (51-100)

Blocking with 51 left Black with a very good feeling.

Black 61 was a bit of an overplay. Simply clamping at 62 would have been good enough.

Black should have played 69 at 83, defending his territory on the lower right side. White 70 was a severe invasion.

Black has been forced to backtrack with 71, but this move gives White little room to maneuver.

Black 91 was dubious. Jumping in with 99 instead would have been the sharper move. In

any case, it was urgent to play somewhere around 91 in this position.




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 3 (101-150)

White 24 was the losing move. White had a powerful move at A: Black would be unable to live in the corner. When Black played 25, his group was alive. If White peeped at 43, Black would attach at B.




Figure 3 (101-150)

Figure 4 (151-197) (next page)

White resigned after Black 197.

Taken from a commentary by Chang Hao.




Figure 4 (151-197)

The 6th King of the New Stars

White: Qiu Jun 4-dan

Black: Hu Yueyu 5-dan

Komi: 5½ points.

Played on March 8, 1999 in Shanghai.

Commentary by Wang Yuang 8-dan.





Figure 1 (1-50)


Figure 1 (1-50)

Capping with 17 was dubious. Since Black already has a stone on the central star point, this move was redundant.

Black 1 in *Dia. 1* would have been a more positive attitude. If Black hanes with 2, White cuts with 3. There is a ladder to consider with the sequence to 9, but it is favorable for Black, so White can't play this way.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

If White wedges in with 2 in *Dia. 2*, the sequence to White 10 will be played. But Black follows up with 11, attacking the white stones at the bottom as well as the six above. Now the black stone on the central star point is shining brightly.



Dia. 3

White 18 and 20 were skillful moves. However, there is a clearer way of playing. White can press Black against the side with the sequence to 9. (Go Seigen played a similar sequence in one of his games a long time ago.) As a result, White ends up with good shape and Black's moyo strategy has been successfully countered.

White 22 was also a good move. Up to 36, White has played very well.

Black could also jump to A with 41.

White 48 was the first losing move. Attaching at 50 instead would be a light way

of playing. After that, if Black hanes at B, White would wedge in at 49 and Black would have too many cutting points, so his position would fall apart. After 48, White's shape is heavy.




Figure 2 (51-100) 100: at 92

Figure 2 (51-100)

Even though White captured the black stone at 41 (in Figure 1), he was unable to make any gains from it.

Figure 3 (101-150)

When Black connected at 1, Qiu made another miscalculation when he captured with 2. This was the second losing move. Black played 3 and the white group in the upper-right corner is unconditionally dead. Had Qiu read this out correctly, he could fight a ko to live. For example, he could create ko threats by attaching at A, instead of 98 in Figure 2, before capturing the ko with 100. Black would then connect at B and White would play C.

Figure 4 (151-221)

White resigned after Black 221.




Figure 3 (101-150) 38: at 25




Figure 4 (151-221)

109: at 16; 110: at 66

International Tournaments

The Spring Orchid Cup Round Two

In the first round Mok Jin-seuk beat Shao Zhengzhong. He then met Chang Hao, who was seeded into the second round. Mok fell behind in the opening, but he struggled valiantly and lost by only $\frac{1}{2}$ point. Chang went

on to beat Yoo Chang-hyuk in the quarterfinals, becoming the only Chinese to gain a place in the semifinals.

White: Mok Jin-seuk 4-dan




Black: Chang Hao 8-dan

Komi: $5\frac{1}{2}$ points; time: 3 hours each.


Played on December 28, 1998 in Beijing.

Figure 1 (1-50)

White 16 was dubious. Chang said that he had never seen this move before. However, it is hard to say how White should play. If he plays as in *Dia. 1*, Black gets an ideal position at the bottom. If he jumps to 1 in *Dia. 2*, White forces with 2 and Black 4 is a new move played by Chen Zude. Next, Black threatens to wedge in with 'a', so Black has a slight advantage. Undoubtedly, these moves will be intensely studied over the next few months.



Figure 1 (1-50)

Dia. 1

Dia. 2

The sequence from 38 to 46 was the reason White came out of the opening with a disadvantage. Since he can already get an eye by forcing with A, he has no need to worry about this group. It would have been better for him to play elsewhere, such as at B at the top. However, White ended in gote at the bottom, so Black was able to take the big point at 47.


Figure 2 (51-100)
Figure 2 (51-100)

Black 53 was a bit loose. If Black played the sequence Black 63-White A-Black B, his group would be secure. Moreover, he would be threatening the weak white group on the upper right side. If White reinforces his group with 61, Black will answer with C and his territory at the top would be secure. This would be a more positive approach.

White should first exchange 99 for Black 100 before playing White 72. In this position, the left side is more important than the upper left corner. With the sequence from 77 to 81, Black captures a stone in sente and his prospects for making territory here are good. Black has taken the lead.


Figure 3 (101-150)

33, 39: at 27; 36, 44: at 30

Figure 3 (101–150)

Black, conscious of his lead, calmly captures with 5, building a thick position in the center. After this, White put up a galant struggle to stage an upset, but Black's lead was too great to overcome.

Black wins by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.




Figure 4 (151–200)




Figure 5 (201–264)

The 3rd Samsung Cup Final Game One

Ma Xiaochun has had bad results against Lee Chang-ho over the last few years. He lost this match too, but it went the full five-game distance. He had a promising start by winning the first game.

White: Lee Chang-ho

Black: Ma Xiaochun

Komi: $5\frac{1}{2}$ points; time 3 hours each.

Played on November 26, 1998.





Figure 1 (1–50)

Figure 1 (1–50)

According to Ma, capping with Black 17 is not the best way to play. Black should enclose the corner with the knight's move of 1 in *Dia. 1*. The marked stone is now on an ideal point. If White now jumps into Black's sphere of influence with 2, Black peeps with 3, then descends to 5. White's stones are heavy and Black has secured a lot of territory. Black should be quite happy with this result.



Dia. 1

After White 36, Black is not happy with his opening, and White 38 was lukewarm. If White defends with A, Black is limited in the damage he can cause at the top. If White is go-

ing to defend the top, attaching at B is better.
White 50 was a good attacking move.




Figure 2 (51-100)

67: at 57, 80: at 64; 81: at 62

Figure 2 (51-100)

The diagonal attachment of Black 51 was a shrewd move.

White lets the lower-left corner fend for itself and switches to the right, making shape with 60. It is not clear whether this is a loose or a calm way of playing. Many pros would simply connect at 76.

White 66, answering the ko threat of 65, was the losing move. White should have ended the ko by capturing at 79. Black would then take the upper right corner. It would then be hard to tell who was winning.

When Black plays 79, White's group in the lower left is unstable; Black takes the lead.




Figure 3 (101-159)

19: at 5

Figure 3 (101-159)

White 4 was the winning move. After the sequence to 11, Black's lead is clear.

White resigns after Black 159.

Game Five

White: Ma Xiaochun

Black: Lee Chang-ho

Komi: 5½ points; time 3 hours each.

Played on February 8, 1998.





Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). Ma's new move

White 10 is a new move that Ma's study group has been investigating recently. Black 11 and 13 are Lee's new response.


White 14 and 15 make good shape. If White answers Black 13 with 1 in Dia. 1, after the exchange of Black 2 for White 3, the peep of Black 4 is a strong move. The sequence would continue to Black 8. White's stones lack a base and are under attack.



Dia. 1


When Black peeps with 17, he wants White to connect at 1 in Dia. 2. Black would then play 2 to secure the corner. This is the correct way to play. White would pincer with 3,

but Black could fight with 4. This is not a good result for White.




Dia. 2

When White pushes up with 18, Black might cut with 1 in *Dia. 3*, White can descend to 2. If Black then blocks with 3, White presses with 4 and 6, then cuts with 8. Black's stones are under attack and his position has collapsed.



Dia. 3


Against White 18, White might simply block at 1 in *Dia. 4*. White cuts with 2 and the sequence continues to White 12. Again Black ends up with a bad position.




Dia. 4

Playing the atari of Black 3 in *Dia. 5* before connecting at 5 is the correct order of moves. After the exchange of 7 for White 8, Black can capture two white stones with 9.

After the game, Ma said that he should have first exchanged White 2 for Black 3 in *Dia. 6* before cutting at 4. If Black makes shape with 5, White will take the corner with 6 for a good result.




Dia. 5



Dia. 6


Lee didn't block in answer White 18, but played in the corner with Black 19 instead. This was a sharp move. However, White took the lead when he secured his stones in the center with the sequence from 20 to 24.

Black 25 showed Lee's good judgment. Black 19 certainly secures the corner, but he also has to worry about his stones there getting sealed in. For example, Black 1 is an excellent point with respect to the bottom, but White attaches with 2 in *Dia. 7*. Black lives with the sequence to 7, but White cuts with 8 and White has a nice position in the center.



Dia. 7


Ma had planned to connect with White 2 in *Dia. 8* if Lee had played Black 1. If Black now plays 3, White will cut through with 4 and 6, and Black must fight for life in the center.



Dia. 8


White 26 is the perfect point for attacking the black stones at the bottom. If Black answers White 26 with 28, White will extend to 34 and he is not unhappy with this result.

If Black had played 33 by escaping into the center with 1 in *Dia. 9*, Ma had planned to cut with 2 and play the sequence to 8. This result is good for White because the six black stones in the center are heavy and make a good target.



Dia. 9

Black 39 forced White to secured the capture of the five black stones at the bottom with 40. If Black had simply made life with the sequence from 1 to 5 in *Dia. 10*, White's stones in the bottom right would end up with good shape after White 6.



Dia. 10





Figure 2 (51-100)


Figure 2 (51-100)

Instead of White 58, White could invade Black's territory on the right with 1 in *Dia. 11*. White 3 and 5 is an interesting variation where White makes a living group with 13.



Dia. 11

Black 85 was an important move. If Black omitted it, White would play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 12*. These moves help the weak white stones on the right and increase White's influence in the center.



Dia. 12

Black defends the corner with 93, then goes on the attack with 97. This was a good move because it attacked the heavy white stones on the right and also defended Black's territory at the top.

Figure 3 (101-150)

Black 11 was a brilliant move. If White tries to cut it off by playing 1 in *Dia. 13*, Black will play the sequence to 10 and White's territory on the upper left side will be greatly reduced.

Black 29 was a bad move. If Black had lost,

this would have been the losing move. Black should have used this move to defend his territory on the right side by playing to the left of 23. He then would have had a good position.






Figure 3 (101-150)
28, 26, 46: at 22; 33, 43: 25

would have to answer with 4. The ko fight would continue to White 23, but since White still has a big ko threat at A, Black has to fall back to 24 and give up the ko. The sequence to White 49 is the natural continuation and White seems to be ahead.



Dia. 15
5, 11, 17, 23: below 2; 8, 14, 20, 29: at 2



Dia. 13

White moved out into the center with 30 and 32. This was better than capturing the stone at 41 in the upper right corner. Ma now was now in a good position to win.

Black 37 reinforced the upper right corner. If this move had been omitted, the black stones there would be in great danger.

White 38 was very severe. Black must defend his territory on the right with 39, and White can pick off Black's stone at 29 at his leisure.

White 42 was wrong. If he had ataried at 1 in Dia. 15, then made a ko threat at 3, White




Figure 4 (151-236)
61 at the triangled stone;
82, 102: at the circled stone; 85, 136: 53

Figure 4 (151-236). Black wins by 2 1/2 points

This was Lee's third victory in a major international tournament this year. In March, he also faced Ma in the 3rd LG Cup final where he won the first two games of that best-of-five match. Then, on May 10 he beat Ma in the third game to pull off the 'Grand Slam' of the international go circuit.

A Fighting Art

1. Qiu Jun vs. Kong Jie

Some people like to talk about go as the art of harmony: two players cooperating to create a work of art. In this kind of go, the theory goes, a player will be tripped up by greed or overaggressiveness. On the other hand, there are games in which the players fight in a spirit of unbridled aggression from start to finish. Such games are not subtle territorial contests in which the player with the superior endgame technique prevails; instead, the key factor is your ability both to dish out punishment and to take it.

Below we present an encounter that is one of the most interesting games we have seen for some time. One of the players is Qiu Jun, the 16-year-old prodigy who won the Chinese individual championship last year with a 10-1 score in the 11-round Swiss-system tournament. However, it is not he who is the hero of this game, but his opponent, Kong Jie, who inflicted his sole loss on Qiu. All we know about Kong is that he is a young player from Beijing who scored seven successive wins in the championship before slipping up in the later rounds. He earned his win over Qiu through some astonishing play, featuring a series of bold sacrifices.

If your go has been in a rut lately, you may learn something from this game.

White: Qiu Jun 4-dan

Black: Kong Jie 4-dan

Played in Chengdu City on 19 September 1998. *Commentary by Hua Yigang 8-dan.*

Figure 1 (1-50). The first sacrifice

Black 15 is a tight move. I would prefer to develop rapidly with Black A, White B, Black 17, White C, Black D. If then White 15, Black answers patiently at E.

After Black 23, it's hard for White to poke his head out, but Black has invested an extra move, so White is satisfied.

The sequence from 24 to 40 is what both players expected. The six black stones have been captured; the problem is how Black uses them.

Black 41 is a ladder block.




Figure 1 (1-50)
37: connects




Figure 2 (51-110)

Figure 2 (51-110). Two great squeezes

Black 53. Black can't hope to get a good result by trying to save his stones here.

White 54 can't be helped; it would be too painful simply to defend with White 58.

Black 63 sets up a beautiful squeeze. The fact that 67 is sente must be very satisfying for Black.

Black 71 is a natural move. Black 77 is an individualistic move — Black gets another marvellous squeeze.

When Black takes the last large point at 93, he has a promising game.

Black 95. Black A would be better.

White 96. Capping around 99 is the most reasonable move.

Black 97 shows good fighting spirit. Black captures White up to 107.

Black 109. Black A is the only move. Therefore, White could have staged an upset if he had played 110 at A.




Figure 3 (111-187)

Figure 3 (111-187). *Sparkling play by Kong*

Black 13 is a satisfying way to settle the shape. Black's play is natural and lively.

[Hua's commentary ends here, but we think that the way Kong sacrifices his four stones at the top is also worthy of comment. How many amateur players would think of playing 21, for example, instead of simply defending with Black 26? Or play an atari at 27 instead of at 32?

If Kong continues to play with the flair and imagination he displayed in this game, we can surely expect to see him on the international stage before long.]

White resigns after Black 187.

Next is a game that ended prematurely because of a ferociously difficult life-and-death problem.

2. The life-and-death problem that was too much for Sakai 9-dan

It's a long time since *Go World* has published a game from the preliminary rounds of a Japanese tournament. We could say that our motive is to show that pros are human just like the rest of us, but you might not be convinced. White loses this game because he couldn't read out a life-and-death problem in the corner, but the reading required was formidable. The player concerned, Sakai 9-dan, is known for his tenacity in analysis, but he just ran out of time.

White: Sakai Takeshi 9-dan

Black: So Yokoku 5-dan

Komi: 5½; time: 5 hours each.

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on 28 January 1999. 3rd preliminary round, 47th Oza tournament.




Figure 1 (1-36)

Figure 1 (1-36). *Putting all your eggs in one basket*

White 20. If White plays the usual move at A, Black defends at B and it's difficult for White to find a good way to defend against the threat of Black C.

Despite the proverb warning against putting all your eggs in one basket, White builds a moyo with 30 to 36. Not even Takemiya is this single-minded.




Figure 2 (37-64)

Figure 2 (37-64). Limiting the moyo

Black 37 is the vital point. White is forced to drop back to 38, which is painful. Black thus limits the potential of the moyo in sente. If instead of 38 White pushed up regardless with 40, then after Black 41-White 42 Black would cut at A, and White would not be able to get enough from his moyo.

White 44. White should simply force with 46 and 48, then invade at B.




Figure 3 (65-81)

Figure 3 (65-81). Not enough time

Black 65 misses a chance to simplify the game with A or B, after which the corner


would be safe from invasion.

White 70 is the losing move. Sakai spent over two and a half hours on it, but he used up all his time and went into byo-yomi before he had worked everything out.


Dia. 1. If White plays 1, the most obvious move, he dies after the continuation to 18.

Dia. 2. White 1 is correct. If Black 2, the continuation here is one line. If Black keeps trying to kill White, he is caught in shortage of liberties up to 29. Instead of 2 —


Dia. 3. If Black gives way with 2, White plays 3 etc. The key move is the clever wedge at 15. Again Black is caught in shortage of liberties.



Dia. 1: White dies



Dia. 2: White lives



Dia. 3: White lives

There was no way to live after White 70. So demonstrated this up to 81, so Sakai had to resign.

Sakai must have looked at many, many variations in his two and a half hours on 70, but somehow he missed the right move. One can't help wondering if during that time So realized that his attack could be refuted.

White resigns after Black 81.

Note: Readers who enjoy fighting games might like to check out the articles entitled *Finesse or Brute Force?* in GW35 and 45. Some spectacular sacrificial games are given in two articles entitled *The Art of Sacrifice* in GW11 and 16. (John Power)

The 23rd Meijin Title Match



Everyone is having a big laugh over the triple ko that led to a no-result.

This was O Rissei's second challenge this year to one of Cho Chikun's titles. After having lost to Cho 4-2 in the Honinbo title match last July (see GW84), O seemed to have been determined to avenge that loss. He dominated the Meijin league with eight straight wins, then won the first game of the match. It seemed that O's first experience with Cho in a best-of-seven title match was now paying dividends. However, Cho came back and won the next two games and seemed to have gained the momentum. He had the advantage in the fourth game and was on the way to an easy victory, but, after a number of slack moves, the game became close. Then a strange thing happened: Cho missed a move that would have enabled him to win by a small margin and a triple ko resulted. With neither side yielding, the game was declared a no-result, the first time this had ever happened in a major title match.

O went on to win the fifth game to even the series, and it was anybody's guess who would now win the match. But Cho convincingly won the sixth game and O was now one game away from losing the match.

The seventh game quickly became an end-game contest. Both sides made mistakes and the lead kept shifting back and forth, but, in the end, it was O who made the last mistake and he lost the game by 1½ points.

Game One

White: Cho Chikun Meijin

Black: O Rissei 9-dan

Komi: 5 ½ points; time: 8 hours each.

Played on September 9 and 10, 1998.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). An incomprehensible move

White 28 was a desperate move, but it turned out well enough, perhaps even to White's advantage. White 44 was another desperate move, but this one was incomprehensible, not to say insane. White should have played A or B. Black cut with 45 and 47, and White was in trouble.




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100). A ray of hope

When White sealed 54 to end the first day of play, everyone thought his position was on the verge of collapse, but White 82 and 84 sent a ray of hope by weakening Black's left side, even though Black captured four white stones in the center. Black should have played 83 before 81 to prevent White 82.




Figure 3 (101-150) 47: connects at 40

Figure 3 (101-150). Black gets captured.

Black compromised in the top right in order to play 19, which put him ten points ahead on the board, but White's bewitching reply at 20 and Black's hane at 29 led to the loss of over a dozen black stones. Rissei-san was pinning his hopes on the cut at A, which took nerve against an opponent like Cho.





Figure 4 (151-181)

Figure 4 (151-181). White dies.

Almost everyone expected the white group to die, and it did, but it could have lived if White had played *Dia. 1*. Why did White play 76 instead? Perhaps the reason is that even if White lives as in *Dia. 1*, he still loses by about 2½ points.



Dia. 1

White resigns after Black 181.

(Abridged from *Kido*, Nov. 1998 by James Davies.)

Game Two

White: O Rissei 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Meijin

Played on September 23 and 24, 1998.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1-35). Invitation declined

It is hard to decide between Black 11 and A, but Black A would leave White B. Black 21 invited White C, which leads to innumerable variations. Rissei-san apparently thought that the fighting would be easier in another part of the board.




Figure 1 (1-35)

Figure 2 (36-73). Ladder block?

Black 45 attacked White's eye shape, but I would prefer Black A, attacking on a larger scale. White 62 may have been a ladder block aimed at White B, but this ladder was an illusion.




Figure 2 (36-73)

Figure 3 (74-100). Danger in the center

Black 87 shattered the illusion of the ladder. Next, Black endangered his center by playing 89 and 91. Black 99 was an example of Meijin-class survival technique, deliberately thin, inviting White to move in so that Black could counter with defensive tactics. White 100 fell for this trap. If White had played 1 in Dia. 1, Black might still have lived in the center, but then the lettered sequence from White 'a' to White 'e' would have created terrible

problems for Black on the upper side. I would have liked to see this fight.





Figure 3 (74-100)



brilliant escapes. At the end of this figure Black is unconditionally alive. After White A-Black B-White C, Black plays D in sente, then E, and either connects the ko for a second eye or connects out between White 6 and 56.




Figure 5 (158-200)

Figure 5 (158-200), Figure 6 (201-237). White struggles valiantly.

The issue was decided when Black's center lived, but White made a valiant effort to pull the game out before finally resigning. This is the way it should be. If you give up too easily, it will affect the rest of the series.




Figure 6 (201-237)

White resigns after Black 237.

(Abridged from Kido, Nov. 1998 by James Davies.)

Game Three

White: Cho Chikun Meijin

Black: O Rissei 9-dan

Played on September 30 and October 1, 1998.

Commentary by Kudo Norio Tengen.




Figure 1 (1-28)

Figure 1 (1-28). An avalanche opening

O's best opening is to put black stones at 1, A, and B, but he played Black 3 and 5 for a change, then avalanched at 11 and 13. Cho chose White 16 instead of C, not from fear of the difficult variations of the avalanche joseki, but to make Black 9 a bad move.




Figure 2 (27-63)

Figure 2 (27-63). Losing already

Several pros said Black should have played 27 low, at 36. I think he should have

played 29 at 43, followed by White 29 and then Black 36. Black 39 was also doubtful. Despite White A, Black should play 39 at B, followed by White 40 and Black C.

Black 45 and 53 declared that Black was losing. If he were not losing, he would play 45 at 47, and 53 at D. Black 61 showed proper spirit, but White had the advantage in this fight because he could link up at E, while Black still had White A to worry about.






Figure 3 (64-82)

Figure 3 (64-82). *Stymied at every turn*

Black had been hoping to steal White's eye space by playing A, but when White cut at 68 Black had to abandon three stones, to avoid greater risks. He wanted to play 81 at B, but could not, for the reason shown in *Dia. 1*. Nor could he play Black 1 in *Dia. 2*. White would link up in sente with 6 and 8, which is very big because it eliminates Black 'a'. Black 81 was played to induce White C and Black D, which would still let White link up but would increase his loss in the center. White decided to postpone C.



Dia. 1 10: connects at 5



Dia. 2





Figure 4 (83-105)

99: captures below 96; 101: connects at 96

Figure 4 (83-105). *White plays a strong move.*

White 1 in *Dia. 3*, though almost completely safe, would leave the remote threat of Black 'a'. To make even more certain of eye shape, White played the stronger move at 102, asking for Black A-White B-Black C-White D. Black naturally countered with 103.



Dia. 3

Figure 5 (106-126). *A running fight*

White was now running with two groups at once. He could win by saving both groups, or by giving up the group including White 10 and capturing the group including Black 7.

Black was in a tight fix because he had to save this group and two other weak groups as well.




Figure 5 (106-126)





Figure 6 (127-145)



Dia. 4

Figure 6 (127-145). A capturing race

Black 27 at A would start a capturing race, but then White 32-Black 34-White 30-Black 33-White B picks up the black group extending from the bottom left. White forced a capturing race anyway by playing 36, instead of

winning the easy way with 1 and 3 in Dia. 4. White 40, instead of White C, kept Black from gaining a liberty with D. Black could have considered playing 39 at E.





Figure 7 (146-176) 65: connects (left of 63)

Figure 7 (146-176). Black runs out of resources.

After White 58, if Black pursues the capturing race, he is two moves behind in a ko. The race is closer if Black can play 49 at 50, followed by White A and Black B, but then Black lacks a good ko threat to answer White C, and even if he can make White connect at D, he still can't get a good result. After White 76, Black can start a large ko by cutting at 5 in Dia. 5, but White ends the ko with 8 and wins the game by a wide margin.



Dia. 5 6: takes ko

Black resigns after White 176.

(Abridged from *Kido*, Nov. 1998 by James Davies.)

Game Four

White: O Rissei 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Meijin

Played on October 14 and 15, 1998.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-52)

Figure 1 (1-52). *A heavy move*

White 14 was heavy, and Black took advantage of it by invading at 17. White should have answered at A. Later, White should have played 36 at B. Black might play C, but then White 37 keeps the game difficult. When Black captured at 37, White was the only one with unstable groups.





Figure 2 (53-100)

79: connects at 58; 96: takes ko at 72

Figure 2 (53-100). *Excruciating*

Black 59 put White in an excruciating position. If White plays 1 in *Dia. 1*, Black plays 2 and White can't escape. By the end of this fig-

ure, Black was worry-free, with everything connected. Black A was expected next. Black A should win the game, because the white group at the top is still weak.



Dia. 1

Figure 3 (101-166). *The game becomes close.*

Invading at Black 1 was also natural, but Black 33 was a mistake, and more mistakes followed. Black missed chances to settle matters by playing both 43 and 47 at 48. White missed a chance to play 52 at A, then play White 53. The result was that White lost the right side, but could squeeze Black from the center. White 66 made the game close.




Figure 3 (101-166) 61: connects at 46

Figure 4 (167-224). *Triple ko*

Black should have played 87 at A, which would have won by a small margin. Black 87 let White play 88 and 90 in sente, threatening to kill the black group with White 93. After taking the ko with White 124, O offered to call the game a triple ko and Cho accepted. This was a historic moment, the first time a title game had ended in a triple ko.




Figure 4 (167-224)

115, 121: at 95; 116, 122: below 101; 117, 123: at 111; 118, 124: at 102; 119: at 101; 120: 114
Triple ko; neither player wins.

(Abridged from *Kido*, Dec. 1998 by James Davies.)

Game Five

White: Cho Chikun Meijin

Black: O Rissei 9-dan

Played on October 22 and 23, 1998.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1-34)

Figure 1 (1-34). *Beyond right and wrong*

White thought for over an hour before playing 16. Although this move blocked the ladder shown in *Dia. 1* and left continuations at White A and B, it could turn out badly depending on how the game developed. The direct move at C was preferable to Black 21, but Black 23 and White 24 go beyond questions of right and wrong. Cho avoided playing 24 at 27

because he thought Black would split him up, and in fact, Black was planning to answer White 27 at D. Black 27 was bad; Black should have played 28. White 34 ended the first day.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Figure 2 (35-64). *Unexpected retreat*

Black 35 was the strongest reply, but White got what he wanted through 54. White could also have played 44 at 45, letting Black capture at 44 but then linking up at A. After 54, Black counterattacked with 55 and 57, but retreated strangely with Black 61. He should have played *Dia. 2*, forcing White to deal with the threat of Black 'a'.




Figure 2 (35-64)

Figure 3 (65-103). *The battle starts.*

Black 65 avoided the terrible result in *Dia. 3*, but Black should have played 71 at A, and 77 at 88. White should have played 90 at B. The threat of the ko at C would be enough to keep Black from trying to run away in the center.





Figure 3 (65-103)



Dia. 3




Figure 4 (104-162)

20: left of 17; 31, 42, 48, 54, 60: at 26;
29, 39, 45, 51, 57, 62: right of 26;

Figure 4 (104-162). A major ko fight.

Capturing two stones with White 10 was a slip. White should have started the ko at 16 before getting completely cut off. Black could

have captured the top with 59, but then White 59-Black A-White B would win the game. White should have answered Black 61, since he still had a good ko threat at A.




Figure 5 (163-200)

Figure 5 (163-200). Black turns the tables.

White 70 (should have been 72) and 76 (should have been 82) were both mistakes. Black turned the tables in the endgame by playing 81 to 97 in sente, then making a further big reduction in White's territory with 99.




Figure 6 (201-294)

12, 18, 91: at 6; 15, 21, at 9;
62, 89: left of 59; 65: at 59; 94: at 49

Figure 6 (201-294). The series is tied.

Playing on to certain victory, Black tied the series up at two wins apiece.

Black wins by 3 1/2 points.

(Abridged from Kido, Dec. 1998 by James Davies.)

Game Six

White: O Rissei 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Meijin

Played on November 11 and 12, 1998.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-32)

Figure 1 (1-32). Clashing proclamations

My personal opinion is that the joseki in the bottom left corner favors White, as long as he can avoid having to defend at A. The moves from White 20 to 32 are a repeated proclamation by White that his bottom left group is safe from attack, and by Black that it isn't.





Figure 2 (33-67)


Figure 2 (33-67). As good as over

Black 41 seems to show that Black's proclamation was right. Black 53 was severe. White should have played 52 at 1 in *Dia. 1*; then his

position might still have been salvageable. White should also have played 56 at 1 in *Dia. 2*, which ends in a seki. White had to answer Black 65 at 66 to avoid being killed, conceding A to Black in sente. When Black cut at 67, the game was as good as over.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2





Figure 3 (68-102)


Figure 3 (68-102). Resorting to madness

Rissei-san, however, is a master at winning lost games, and his next move at White 68 was nasty. Black had to reply patiently at 69. If Black plays 1 in *Dia. 3*, White gets a good result by sliding to 4.

White 72 was bold to the point of madness, but when confronting Cho, one tends to resort to madness.



Dia. 3






Figure 7 (201-261)

Game Seven

White: O Rissei 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Meijin

Played on November 11 and 12, 1998.

Commentary by Cho Chikun.





Figure 1 (1-16)

Figure 1 (1-16). Breaking the symmetry

Black should play 13 at A, and that's all there is to say about the opening. If White replies at 2 in *Dia. 1*, Black plays 3, or perhaps 'a'. The left side is symmetrical, so the next move there is valuable. The full extension to Black 1 is the key point. Naturally I thought of this move, but I didn't play it, because in the previous game I had gotten into danger by answering the marked move in *Dia. 2* with Black 1, instead of playing 1 at 6 for an easy win. That made me think in all seriousness that this

time, I should play Black 13. You could say that this is where the game began. Once Black trades 13 for White 14, Black A doesn't follow, so the opening proceeds with Black 15 and White 16 instead.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2





Figure 2 (17-38)

Figure 2 (17-38). A can't-win policy

Black 21 was in the same vein. Black 34 would have been better, but I chose to play conservatively, leaving White 25 and Black A as miai, to see what would happen. What happened was White 22. If Black replies at 24, White plays 32, and Black B is gone. I played Black 25 to try to take sente. If Black just plays 27, White will make forcing ataris at 28 and 30. Since I had played for sente, I should have carried through by playing 33 at B, but I changed my mind and followed an inconsistent, can't-win policy by playing 33. One reason was that 33 looked like a huge move for White.

Another reason was the analysis in *Dia. 3*. After the two marked stones have been played, adding the five white a's and five black b's is clearly to White's advantage.



Dia. 3





Figure 3 (39-51)




Dia. 4

Figure 3 (39-51). The beckoning invasion

Black 39 to 45 began building up the lower side. I expected White 46. White 48, the sealed move, could have been White 1 in *Dia. 4*, but Rissei-san must have realized that he had a good opening and steered clear of complications, even though *Dia. 4* is risky for Black. White 50 was surprising. I couldn't imagine any move except White 1 in *Dia. 5*. Rissei-san commented that Black 2 and so on would be

big and would leave cutting worries at 'a' and 'b'. He had naturally compared this with White 50 and White A, but what strikes the eye here is the black invasion at B, which I didn't make. I was psychologically rattled and played Black 51 instead.



Dia. 5





Figure 4 (50-79)


Figure 4 (50-79). Black gains momentum.

I played Black 51 because White's unexpected move at 50 so obviously begged for the invasion at A. Since White seemed to want this invasion, I began to doubt whether it would be a wise move. Doubts like these can grip a player like the fear of bogies in the dark. As soon as I turned my back at 51, Rissei-san played White 52. He had been afraid of the invasion after all. This was quite a piece of gamesmanship.


Dia. 6 (next page) shows one possible development from the invasion. There are many variations, but Black seems heavy, and I thought this might be a kind of trap, so I avoided it. When I thought about it later, *Dia. 6* didn't seem so bad for Black.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Black 53 was a strategic decision. This move should be compared with *Dia. 7*, in which Black expands nicely at 5. I decided

against *Dia. 7* because it gives White a nearly living shape. If White plays 56 at 1 in *Dia. 8*, Black's plan is to play 2, then block the ladder at 4. White 5 was suggested as a reply, but Black plays 6 and 8. If White plays 'a', Black 'b' is destructive. If White plays 'b' and Black plays 'a', Black has the advantage. If you analyze White's capture at 'b' by mentally removing White 1 and 3, the loss of two black stones there isn't so big.

Black 59 and 61 were preparations for Black 63. I thought White might play 60 around B, but White must have been afraid of the ko created by Black C–White D–Black E. For Black's part, retreating to Black B after Black 61 would be unsound. Black 63, 65, and 67 were played according to plan, building up the bottom. Having played Black 53, I wanted to threaten White's eye shape a little.

I expected White to continue at F, but Rissei-san began surrounding territory with White 68. He must have played that way out of confidence in the lead, but Black gained power by snaring White 66. If that gave White the lead, it couldn't be helped.





Figure 5 (80–102)

Figure 5 (80–102). The nearly-losing move

The game was turning into an endgame contest. White 86 was both large and small. If Black plays 1 to 9 in *Dia. 9*, White has to choose between 'a', which loses nearly a point, and 'b', which gives Black lots of ko threats. What I was worried about, however, was White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e' in the top right. Black will then have to try to set up the ladder at 'f'.



Dia. 9 8: connects

Black 89 and 91 seemed to even things up, so I thought I'd play a sure-fire move at Black 93, but this essentially lost the lead. It is very difficult to say where Black should use sente at this point, and I'm still not certain of the best move, but Black A is one good candidate, and Black B-White C-Black D is another. If Black chooses A or B, he is not necessarily behind.

White 98 shored up White's weak position in the center. This was the proper move, but White could have come crashing in at E.





Figure 6 (103-139)

Figure 6 (103-139). Black misses his chance.

Black 93 had clearly lost the game, but the lead kept swinging back and forth, like the pendulum of a metronome. White's clamp at 12 was correct on shape, but did not really accomplish much. If White had come in at 29, he

would probably have won. Black's chance came at 21. I thought this diagonal move took enough central territory to regain the lead, but White 28 to 36 made Black's center very small. I should have followed my first impulse and played Black 1 in Dia. 10. I held back because Black 1 looked a little thin, but White's counterplay is difficult. If White plays 2 to 6, Black compromises with 7. If White 6-Black 'a'-White 'b'-Black 8 and then White 2, Black compromises with 'd'. This is much better than Black's result in the game.



Dia. 10





Figure 7 (140-172)

Figure 7 (140-172). White misses chances too.

We were down to the small stage endgame and the lead was still shifting, so this game was no masterpiece. White 58 and 60, shown as 1 and 3 in Dia. 11, were two key mistakes.



Dia. 11

After these moves, Black A–White B–Black C threatens Black D, and if White defends with E, Black can still atari at F. If Black wins the ko at G, Black F could lead to a seki. Failing that, if Black wins the ko at H, White will have to connect at F. If White leaves the 1–2 exchange unplayed, however, he can counter Black A–White B–Black C with White 2–Black 1–White E, which is why White 58 was a mistake. Despite 58, White still wins if he plays 60 at 65. White also wins if he plays 72 at A or B, but Rissei-san was anxious to play White 72 because he had noticed the implications of *Dia. 11*. Ironically, I hadn't.





Figure 8 (173–228)

103: at 90; 104: 98; 128: at 101

Figure 8 (173–228). Final mistakes

Black 73 was a game-winning attach-

ment, except that it was premature. If Black plays 73 after Black 77 and White 78, he wins by half a point. Since Black played 73 and 75 first, White could have won by half a point by playing 1 in *Dia. 12*. This was a good example of the game being lost by the player who made the last mistake. Winning it was pure luck.



Dia. 12

Black wins by 1 1/2 points.

(Translated from *Kido*, Jan. 1999 by James Davies).



O Rissei pondering how he went wrong at the end of the final game, while Cho listens to an interviewer's question.

Michael Redmond on the Opening

In this issue's installment we again take up the low Chinese opening. (See GW83 for my earlier treatment of this opening.) The basis for our analysis is the third game of this year's Kisei title match between Cho Chikun and Kobayashi Koichi. The first six moves are shown in *Figure 1*.





Figure 1 (1-6)


In the second game of this match, White (Cho) played in the diagonally opposite corner from Black 1 with 2 in *Dia. 1*. Kobayashi immediately approached with 3. When White answered with 4, Black occupied the lower right corner on the far 3-4 point. White then occupied the upper-left corner with 6, and Black played 7, setting up the mini-Chinese pattern at the bottom. This way of playing has become popular recently.



Dia. 1


If White is intent on avoiding this pattern, he will play 2 in the upper-left corner in *Dia. 2*.

If Black doesn't want to play on the star point in the lower right, he will usually choose between A and B. If Black B, White will play C if he wants to avoid the mini-Chinese pattern. Against Black A, White D or the star point would be more natural.




Dia. 2

Instead of playing 5 in *Figure 1*, Black could also approach with 1 at the bottom in *Dia. 3*, then extend to 3. If White approached with 4, Black would pincer with 5. The sequence might continue to White 10 and Black would reinforce his right side with 11, although Black might also consider playing A instead, an important point which robs White of a base. The white stones are under attack, but Black's position at the bottom is thin; still, his stones are working well. Black will try to strengthen his stones at the bottom by attacking White.




Dia. 3

If White doesn't like this result, he can play other approach moves such the large-knight's approach of 1 in *Dia. 4*. If Black 2, White can extend to 3 or A. The small-knight's approach of White B is also possible, but it is not seen very often. White 1 is the move most often played nowadays.




Dia. 4

In response to the large-knight's approach, Black 2 in *Dia. 5* is a commonly played move. The sequence to White 11 is one joseki. Black 12 is a thick move, but Black could also jump to A and build a large moyo at the bottom. White 11 at B would be bad because it would induce Black to extend to C, thereby strengthening his position.



Dia. 5


In answer to White 5, Black 6 in *Dia. 6* is another joseki. Black 4 at A is also possible.



Dia. 6


In the game we are considering here, Cho played the low Chinese opening with 5 in Fig-

ure 1, but Black 1 on the fourth line in *Dia. 7* is another opening strategy. This is the high Chinese opening. Since Black 1 is high, Black's side territory is weak against invasions on the third line. Black will try to develop quickly and expand his moyo into the center to counteract this weakness. If White extends along the bottom with 2 to counter this strategy, Black will extend to 3, aiming to build a moyo at the top. Later, Black will aim to enlarge his moyo by playing somewhere around the center point with a move such as A.



Dia. 7


When Black has played the low Chinese opening, this strategy is not feasible because White can easily erase Black's moyo by capping at 1 in *Dia. 8*.




Dia. 8

When Black has played the low Chinese opening with the marked stone in *Dia. 9*, he looks forward to the approach of White 1. Black will attach with 2. After standing at 3,

White can only make the narrow extension to 5 because the marked stone is perfectly placed. Next, Black can put pressure on the white stones while expanding his moyo on the lower right by jumping to 6.




Dia. 9




Dia. 10

When Black has played the high Chinese opening with the marked stone, Black can attack the white stones with the knight's move of 1 in *Dia. 10* or by making an iron pillar at A. These are not as efficient as having a stone at A to begin with.



Dia. 11




Dia. 12

Instead of White 6 in *Figure 1*, White 1 in *Dia. 11* can also be played. If Black makes an enclosure with 2, White will extend to 3. White 1 for Black 2 are an even trade, with White strengthening the lower side as Black protects the corner. As it is, White 1 induces Black to make territory in the corner.

White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 12* are also possible, but these moves do not have much influence


in the center. Black can force White into a low position by playing a shoulder hit at A, a knight's move at B, or by capping at C. The virtue of these moves is that White's position here is secure, and also that Black 2 is more or less forced, while Black has a choice in *Dia. 11*.

Black could also pincer at 2 in *Dia. 13*. This would lead to fierce fighting. White could next approach at A or attach at B. If White A, Black C, would lead to a complicated fight.




Dia. 13

White might also exchange 3 for 4 in *Dia. 14*, then pincer at 2 with 5. After Black and White jump out into the center with 6 and 7, the game becomes complicated. In any case, the pincer of Black 2 will lead to difficult fighting. Recently, Black 6 at A has been played and it seems to give Black a strong position.



Dia. 14


The order of moves in *Dia. 11* is important. If White plays 1 after playing the marked stone in *Dia. 15*, Black will attach at 2 and play the sequence to 6. Later, Black can play the sequence Black A-White B-Black C, securing a large profit, while White's marked stone, 1, and 5 are overconcentrated. The marked white stone would be better placed at D.



Dia. 15

This demonstrates the flexibility of the low Chinese opening. Black can start a vicious fight, as in *Dia. 13* or *Dia. 14*, or go for territory as in *Dia. 15*, depending on how White plays.

White must also be careful about making an approach at 1 in *Dia. 16*. The marked black stone is lying in wait. For example, if White continues with 3 and 5, he can only extend to 7 because the marked stone is in the way. White's stones are under attack. For this reason, White is not in any hurry to make an approach move in the lower-right corner. I discussed this joseki in my article in GW83.



Dia. 16

Black approached with 7 in *Figure 2*, then extended to 9. Looking at the whole board, Black's position is well-balanced and he has good prospects of making a moyo at the top. Instead of 7, Black could have played in between White's positions at A. An approach move at B would also have been good.




Figure 2 (7-9)

Invading the black moyo on the right is now urgent. The sequence to White 14 in *Figure 3* is the usual joseki. Black is building a strong position at the top, but there are still weak points at A, B, and C that White can aim at. White's three stones on the right, however, are still weak and Black will try to cover his weaknesses by attacking them.






Figure 3 (10-14)

Defending the corner with Black 1 in *Dia. 17* is a strong move. It attacks the marked white stone and directly defends the corner. The only problem is that it leaves the top open for a white invasion. In other words, it is slow in defending the position at the top. In the game (*Figure 3*), Black got to play 13. There, however, his corner is still open to an invasion at A, and White can also invade at B or C.




Dia. 17

If White starts to move on the right side with 3 and 5 in *Dia. 18*, Black will defend with the sequence to 6. Black's corner is now rock solid and Black has been able to defend at 6 as well. If White played this way, the weakness at A in *Figure 3* would be eliminated.



Dia. 18

After White 14 in *Figure 3*, Black can attack the white stones by jumping to 1 in *Dia. 19*. White must defend with a move such as 2, but Black can now build a moyo at the bottom by extending to 3.



Dia. 19

Black 15 in *Figure 4* was a surprising move. Black's strategy is to attack severely and protect his upper side in the course of the fight. However, I think it is the first time this move has been played.






Figure 4 (15-16)

Black was hoping that White would submissively answer with 2 as in *Dia. 20*. This would be the normal response to Black 1. Black could then confine the white stones to the right side with the sequence to 11. Black's strategy here was to defend the weaknesses at the top by attacking White's stones on the side. That is —


White cannot invade the corner with 1 in *Dia. 21*. After Black 6, White has no clear way of making eyes. Black can also force with A-G, etc., to strengthen his position on the upper side before killing White.



Dia. 20




Dia. 21



Dia. 22

In answer to Black 3 in *Dia. 22*, White might try to escape into the center by jumping to 4. Black jumps to 5, but, after White 6, Black defends the top with 7. White's group on the right is still without eyes, so he cannot invade at A because, if Black descends to B, the white group will come under a severe attack. In conclusion, by attacking with 1 and 3, Black has managed to defend two of his weaknesses at the top. Moreover, Black still has a continuing attack on the white group.



Dia. 23

Although the white stones are vulnerable, White still has some aji he can later try to exploit. Black's position below is still thin, and White might be able to exploit it by attaching at 1 in Dia. 23. After White cuts with 3, Black cannot capture White 1 in a ladder because of the marked white stone. Therefore, he must draw back to 4. Timing, however, is impor-

tant, and White must make sure that his group in the upper right is secure before he tries to exploit this aji. Considering these last few diagrams, it was only natural that White resisted with 16 in Figure 4.





Figure 5 (17-46)

The fight continued to White 46 in Figure 5. This game, along with the others in the Kisei title match, will be analyzed in the next issue.


Making Good Shape

Learning how to make good shape for your stones when fighting in the middle game is an important technique to acquire. Here are some problems that should help you learn this technique.




Problem 1

If White can make good shape for his stones on the left side, he will have a good game.




Problem 2

White ataris with the marked stone, threatening to break through Black's wall at the top. How should Black respond?




Problem 3

White attaches with the marked stone.
How should Black respond?




Problem 6

After the exchange of the marked stones,
how can Black make good shape?




Problem 4

What is the most efficient way for White to
settle his stones in the lower left corner?




Problem 7

How can White take the territory in the
corner and keep Black's moyo small?



Problem 5

How should Black answer the cut of the
marked white stone?




Problem 8

What is the best way for White to live in the
corner? Note the marked black stone.

Making Good Shape: Answers


Problem 1




Correct Answer

White should atari with 1. After Black captures with 2, White can make shape with 3. When playing these moves, however, White must be prepared for Black 'a'.

What happens after Black cuts through with 1 to 5 in *Dia. 1*?




Dia. 1



Dia. 2


White will atari with 6 in *Dia. 2* and sacrifice two stones with the sequence to Black 11. White is satisfied with this result because he ends in sente. He also has a thick position facing the thin black stones in the upper left, so he can easily take territory there.

White 1 in *Dia. 3* is a heavy and ponderous move. Black can attack with 2 and White's stones in the center have bad shape.




Dia. 3

Cutting with White 1 in *Dia. 4* is also bad. After Black 2, White must fall back with 3, but Black cuts through with 4 and 6; White is in trouble.




Dia. 4



Dia. 5


Connecting with White 1 *Dia. 5* also leaves White with a heavy shape after Black 2.

Problem 2




Correct Answer

It is essential that Black counteratari with 1 in the *Correct Answer*.



Dia. 1 4: connects above 2

When White captures with 2 in *Dia. 1*, Black ataris with 3, forcing White to connect above 2 with 4. Next, Black connects with 5, making a thick position on the outside. If White captures with 6 and 8, Black expands his moyo with 7 and 9. Later, Black can aim at 'a'.




Dia. 2 Failure

When White ataris with the marked stone in the problem diagram, Black must not connect with 1. After Black 7, White will cut with 8, and Black's stones in the center are in tatters. Furthermore, the marked black stone has lost its effectiveness, so White will also be able to hane at 'a', enabling him to make further inroads into Black's moyo.


Problem 3

After exchanging 1 for White 2 in the correct answer, Black 3 is the key move.


White might crawl to 1 in *Dia. 1*, but Black 2 forces White to capture with 3. Now Black can take the territory at the bottom with 4.



Correct Answer




Dia. 1 Variation 1




Dia. 2 Variation 2

If White immediately ataris with 1 in *Dia. 2*, Black will exchange 2 for White 3, then take the bottom territory with 4. White might play 3 at 4, but then Black will capture at 'a'.

In conclusion, although Black has lost a stone on the right, the white territory at the bottom has become Black's. There is no question that this exchange is favorable for Black.



Dia. 3 Failure 1




Dia. 4 Failure 2

If Black fails to sacrifice his stone at 1 in *Dia. 3* and captures with 3, White will atari with 4, and Black is confined to the corner.


Blocking the marked stone with Black 1 in *Dia. 4* is a bad move. White will draw back with 2. Now when Black attaches with 3, White draws back with 4 and Black's stones lack eye shape in the corner, so they will have to make eyes in the center.

Problem 4

Cutting with White 1 in the correct answer is the tesuji.




Correct Answer



Dia. 1 Continuation

White's aim is to descend to 3, then build thickness by squeezing with the sequence to 13. Now his pincer at 15 makes an ideal extension from the thick position he has made at the bottom.




Dia. 2 Variation


Instead of 6 in Dia. 1, Black might have at 1 in Dia. 2. In this case, the diagonal connection of White 4 is the tesuji after the 2-3 exchange. After forcing with 8, White's pincer at 10 is again the perfect move.

White 1 in Dia. 3 is the usual joseki move, but Black will extend to the key point of 4 after White blocks with 3. White 5 is the correct way to attack when Black doesn't complete the joseki, but since Black is strong in the lower right corner, this attack will probably not work well.


Blocking with White 1 in Dia. 4 is not a good move. After Black descends to 4 —



Dia. 3 Questionable




Dia. 4 Failure




Dia. 5 Continuation

The joseki continues to White 9 in Dia. 5, but Black ends in sente, so he can extend to the key point of 10. This result is better for Black than Dia. 3 because his position at the bottom here is thicker.

Problem 5




Correct Answer



Dia. 1 Continuation

Black first ataris with 1 in the correct answer, then descends to 3. His intention is to build thickness by squeezing. Next —


The sequence to White 10 in *Dia. 1* is forced. Finally, Black fixes up his shape with 11, and he has constructed a large moyo on the right side.




Dia. 2 Failure

It is extremely bad style for Black to save his two stones in the upper right by crawling with the sequence to 9 in *Dia. 2*. White will next jump to 10. It is now White instead of Black who has built up the potential for a large-scale moyo.

Problem 6



Correct Answer




Dia. 1 Continuation

The hane of Black 1 in the *Correct Answer* works perfectly with the marked stone on the fourth line. However, the follow-up moves are also important. Next —

White has no other move but to cut with 2


in *Dia. 1*. With the sequence to 7, Black has made a thick position facing the center and reinforced his territory on the right side. In this position, Black 'a' is a strong move which expands Black's moyo in the center. Because of the aji of the captured stone to the right of 6, it will be hard for White to counter this move.



Dia. 2 Failure


Black 1 and 3 are bad moves. After 4, White becomes thick. If Black 'a' next, White will slide to 'b', and it is White that gets territory on the right side instead of Black. Comparing this diagram with *Dia. 1* should make it clear how bad Black's result is here.

Problem 7




Correct Answer

The atari of White 1 is correct. Next —




Dia. 1 Continuation 1

White ataris with 3, forcing Black to capture with 4, After Black ataris again with 5 —




Dia. 2 Continuation 2

Black must connect with 6 and White 7 forces Black to connect again at 8. White fixes up his shape in the corner with 9, and Black must capture with 10 and 12 ending in gote. White can now use his sente to take a big point at the top with 13.




Dia. 3 Failure 1

Instead of 3 in *Dia. 1*, connecting with White 1 in *Dia. 3* is a bad move. Now it is Black who ends in sente, after sealing off the bottom with 2 and 4, and he uses it to take the big point at the top with 6.




Dia. 4 Failure

White 1 in *Dia. 4* is a slack move. Black will simply connect at 2 and he is satisfied with the size of his territory at the bottom.




Dia. 5 Bad for Black

In answer to the atari of White 1 in *Dia. 5*, Black must not connect at 2. White will atari with 3, then crawl to 5. White gets a big territory in the corner and has taken away most of Black's territory at the bottom. If Black plays 4 at 5, White will connect at 'a'.




Dia. 6

The sequence to Black 13 in *Dias. 6* and 7 shows the joseki from which the position in the problem arose.



Dia. 7


Problem 8



Correct Answer

With the marked stone in place descending to White 1 in the best move. White now threatens to slide to 'a' or extend to 'b'.


If Black blocks at 2 in *Dia. 1*, White will play 3 and 5, then connect at 7. White has made a big life in the corner. In the future, White can aim at the cut at 'a'. If Black hanes at 'b', White should live by making good shape with 'c'.



Dia. 1 Continuation


The diagonal connection of 1 in *Dia. 2*, followed by the sequence to 7, is the usual way for White to live in this kind of position. But

with the marked black stone in place, this way is dubious. Eventually, 'a' is Black's privilege, and White must defend at 'b'. Compared to *Dia. 1*, Black is happier with this diagram.



Dia. 2

Connecting with White 1 in *Dia. 3* is a bad move. After White 5, Black 6 is annoying.



Dia. 3

The Cover

By William Pinckard

A Burlesque of Kibi and the Chinese Minister. An oban diptych by Kuniyoshi, published by Daikokuya Kinnosuke in 1856.

This somewhat enigmatic design is titled *Ningyo Mitate Shinjubutsu*, 'Mannequins as Gods, Confucianists, and Buddhas', and apparently illustrates some of the type of elaborate, life-size artificial figures which were a popular attraction at fairs. In the background we see Kibi Daijin playing the first stone of his game with the Chinese minister. In the foreground at the right Pindola-bharadvaja is parodied — he was one of the Buddha's 16 arhats and broke his vow of chastity by impulsively speaking of a woman's beauty. In this parody, the woman is no great beauty, but Usume no Mikoto, the fat goddess whose comic dance

lured Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess, out of her cave at the dawn of mythological history, as is recounted in the creation myths of the *Kojiki*.

Obituary

We regret to inform our readers that Kano Yoshinori 9-dan died of heart failure on May 21, 1999. Kano was born on April 14, 1928. He was a disciple of Suzuki Hideko 5-dan. He became 1-dan in 1943 and 9-dan in 1962. He played in the Honinbo league four times. He was a specialist in the endgame, the composer of many endgame problems, and wrote *The Endgame Dictionary*. Many of the small-board problems in that book were published in *Get Strong at the Endgame*. He is best known to western go players as the author of the four-volume set *Graded Go Problems for Beginners*.

A New Publication from Kiseido

Cosmic Go

A Guide to Four-Stone Handicap Games

by Sangit Chatterjee and Yang Huiren

There are few books on handicap go that attempt to give recipes for good play. Those that do exist advise simplistic, safe, but slightly ineffective josekis. *Cosmic Go* takes a different approach. The authors teach you to take the severest path in the opening and play on a large scale. They instruct you to create big open spaces and not worry about territory in the opening. Handicap go books will tell you to create thickness, but this book will teach you how to create it, then use it to construct moyos. It will also show you how to use it to your advantage in fights.

Cosmic Go explores the foundation of two, three, and four-star-points-in-a-row patterns, using examples from professional even games; it takes its inspiration from Takemiya Masaki's patented cosmic-go style of play. *Cosmic Go* will show you how to apply these principles to four-stone handicap games. The four joseki chapters, which contain many new josekis, illustrate how to use them in more than 100 full-board problems. These problems deal with a large number of openings and the proper use of josekis covered in the earlier chapters. Tesujis, trick moves, and good shape are treated in depth. A solid understanding of these principles will make winning your four-stone handicap games a snap and you will soon find your handicap stones drifting away like leaves in the autumn breeze.

About the authors

Yang Huiren was born in 1952 in China. He learned go at the age of 12 and became a professional player. He studied molecular biology at Chongqing University. He immigrated to the United States in 1993 and now lives in the Boston area. He has participated in the North American Master Tournament and the Samsung Cup in Korea.

Sangit Chatterjee is a professor of statistics at Northeastern University and lives in Boston. He has been studying go for 25 years and is a student of Yang Huiren.

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
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
Endgame Problems on 5x5 Boards (4)

by Fukui Masaaki 8-dan


Studying the endgame on the standard 19x19 board can be quite exhausting and involve complicated calculations as well as figuring out difficult sente-gote relationships. This is one reason why many amateurs do not devote as much time to the endgame as they should. On smaller boards, however, endgame study becomes more manageable. I believe that the ideal way for players to begin their study of the endgame is to start on a 5x5 board. The board is small enough so that all you have to do is to find the key move that wins. To this end I have composed more than 250 endgame problems for this size board. I give another twelve in this installment. Regard these problems as compositions that illustrate an endgame technique. They are not the result of actual play. In all problems, Black plays first and he must win by one point or more. A draw is considered a failure. Answers begin on the next page.




Problem 1




Problem 2




Problem 3




Problem 4




Problem 5




Problem 6




Problem 7




Problem 8




Problem 9



Problem 10




Problem 11




Problem 12

Answers to 5x5 Board Endgame Problems




Problem 1
Failure

If Black blocks with 1, White will play 2. If Black captures with 3, White plays 4 and starts a ko. Black can't connect below 3, and he has no ko threats, so he loses all his stones.




Problem 1
Black wins by one point.

Black must block at the top with 1. After White 2, Black will eventually have to capture at 'a', but Black ends up with three points to White's two.



Problem 2
Failure


Black 1 is a bad move. After White captures at 'a', White wins by one point.



Problem 2
Black wins by one point.


5: takes ko; 7: connects the ko

If Black throws in a stone with 1, White must capture with 2, then, after Black 3, he can't connect at 6 but must first capture with 4. Next, Black takes the ko with 5 and connects after White 6.




Problem 3
Failure

If Black plays 1, White will play at 2; the result is a draw after Black 3.




Problem 3
Black wins by one point.

Black 1 is a forcing move. After White connects at 2, the key move is for Black to connect at 3. Any other move will allow White to play 'a' and Black's territory will be destroyed.




Problem 4
Failure

If Black plays 1, the result is a draw.




Problem 4
Black wins by one point.
White 6: connects below 4

Black must atari with 1 and squeeze with 3 and 5. After Black 7, the position is a seki, but White will have to sacrifice a stone on the left and on the right to maintain this seki, so Black will win by one point.



Problem 5
Failure


If Black plays 1, the result is a draw after Black defends with 5.



Problem 5

Black wins by one point.

After forcing with 1, the key move is for Black to fall back to 3. If Black plays 3 at 'a', White will jump to 'b' and create a seki.




Problem 6

Failure

7: throws in above 3;

8: captures at 3


Black 1 is an overplay. Up to White 10, Black loses all of his stones.



Problem 6

Black wins by one point.


Black 1 is the correct move. After White 4, Black wins by one point.



Problem 7

Failure

Black 1 is the wrong move. After White takes the vital point at 2, there is no way that Black can win.




Problem 7

Black wins by one point.

6: at 1


Wedging in with 1 is the tesuji. Black gets two eyes when he plays 3 and 5. White must now defend with 6, but Black turns the right side into a seki with 7.



Problem 8

Failure


Capturing with 1 results in a two-point loss for Black.



Problem 8

Black wins by one point.


Clamping with Black 1 is the tesuji. White must play 2 and Black can now capture and link up with 3. If White plays 2 at 'a', a ko will result. Black has a ko threat at 4, so White will lose all of his stones.



Problem 9

Failure


If Black plays 1, White will play 2. If Black tries to make an eye with 3, White sacrifices a stone with 4, then makes an eye with 6. All of Black's stones are dead.



Problem 9

Black wins by two points.


Black 1 creates a seki, but White must sacrifice two stones to prevent Black from getting an eye, so Black wins by two points.



Problem 10

Failure


If Black plays the ordinary sequence to 7, he will lose by one point. If Black plays 3 at 4, the sequence White 6-Black 3-White 'a' will be played and all of Black's stones will die.



Problem 10

Black wins by two points.


Black 1 is the tesuji. After 3 and 5, Black makes two eyes, then makes a seki with 7. Black wins by two points.



Problem 11

Failure

If Black plays 3 after Black 1, the result is a draw after White connects at 4.




Problem 11

Black wins by one point.

7: takes ko; 8: at 5; 9: at 4


Black must throw in a stone with 3 and start a ko fight. White captures the ko with 4, but Black has a ko threat at 5, while White has none.



Problem 12

Failure

Black 1 is a good move, but Black 3 lets White play 4 and Black loses all of his stones. If Black 3 at 4, White plays 3 and Black must defend at 'a'; the result is a draw.




Problem 12

Black wins by one point.


If Black falls back to 3 after the exchange of Black 1 for White 2, he will win by one point.

Four Endgame Problems on 9x9 boards


In the four problems below, find the best endgame sequence for Black. Answers start on page 58.




Problem 1



Problem 3



Problem 2



Problem 4

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
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
Answers to 9x9 Board Endgame Problems

Problem 1. Black wins by 2 points.




Dia. 1

Dia. 1. It doesn't make any difference whether Black first plays 1 on the left or 5 on the right; both moves are sente. But Black 1 on the left is so big that it is only commonsense for Black to play this move first. White must play 2 and 4 to live, so Black can now make the placement tesuji at 5.



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. White must connect at 6, so Black can play 7 and 9 in sente. After White 10, Black captures with 11. This move is gote, but there is nothing comparable in size left. The game is now decided. Black 21 is the final move. Black has 13 points of territory, while White has 11.




Dia. 3

Dia. 3. Black 5 ('a' in this diagram) in *Dia. 1* was an important endgame tesuji. Many amateur players might be tempted to atari with 1


here, but this is not good because White can eventually capture the stone at 1. This would result in a two-point difference compared to *Dia. 2*. If Black simply played 1 at 3, White would defend at 'a', and White would win by 1 point.

Problem 2. The result is a draw.



Dia. 1


Dia. 1. The cut of Black 1 is the tesuji. White must answer with 2 and eventually he must also capture at 'a'. Next, Black plays 3 and 5, forcing White to connect at 6.



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. With his sente, Black switches to the lower left corner with 7 and 9, creating a seki and leaving White with no territory there.


Next, White captures two stones with 10 and Black gets the last endgame points with 11 and 13. The result is a draw: both sides have 15 points.



Dia. 3


Dia. 3. White must be careful how he answers Black 1. If he connects at 2, Black will play 3 and White can't prevent a link-up. White's territory in the corner is wiped out.

Problem 3. Black wins by one point.




Dia. 1

Dia. 1. The monkey jump of Black 1 is the obvious endgame move. Attaching with White 2 is the standard response. After White 8, the sequence comes to a pause.



Dia. 2


Dia. 2. Next, Black attaches at 9 and turns the upper left corner into a seki with the sequence to 13. White takes the last big endgame point by capturing with 14. The game ends with the exchange of 15 for 16, and Black wins by one point.



Dia. 3


Dia. 3. When Black plays 1 (9 in *Dia. 2*), White cannot avoid the seki by playing 2. After Black 5, the corner is still a seki. White 4 at 5 starts a ko fight, but this is unreasonable because White has no ko threats.

Problem 4. Black wins by one point.




Dia. 1

Dia. 1. Black 1 is sente. White must defend at 2 or else Black will play on that point and make a ko to kill the white stones in the corner. Next, Black wedges in with 3. Black cannot block at 'a' or he will lose some stones in the center. Therefore —



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. White must fall back and defend at 4. After exchanging Black 5 for White 6, Black must defend the corner with 7. White 8 is the last point of the game. Black wins by one point.




Dia. 3

If Black omits 7 in *Dia. 2*, White 1 becomes the vital point. If Black fights back with 2, White plays 3, aiming to turn the corner into a ko. Black must defend with 4, and White now connects with 5 creating a seki in the corner. If White had any ko threats, he could start a ko by playing 'a', but in this game a ko isn't necessary. Actually, Black can avoid the ko by playing the sequence White 1–Black 5–White 'b'–Black 4–White 3. The result here is a simply seki without any possibility of a ko.


An Introduction to Basic Josekis (4)

This series is aimed at players around 20-kyu. It is intended to give them an understanding of the most commonly played josekis and how they are applied in the fuseki. Each move in the joseki is analyzed and the reason it is played is completely explained.

After White approaches the black stone on the star point with the marked stone in *Dia. 1*, the one-space pincer of Black 1 has become one of the most frequently played moves in recent years. White has five standard responses: jumping to 'a', invading the corner with 'b', making another approach at 'c' or 'd', and attaching at 'e'. In this installment we will analyze the jump to White 'a'.




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

In response to White 1 in *Dia. 2*, defending the right side with Black 2 is the natural move. Next, White 3 is the most frequently played move. Black has two ways to continue: at 'a' and 'b'.



Dia. 3 Joseki

If Black crawls to 1 in *Dia. 3*, the sequence to Black 9 is the basic joseki. The moves here are almost forced. Note especially Black 3 and Black 5.




Dia. 4


Black 3 in *Dia. 3* must not be omitted. If Black crawls to 1 in *Dia. 4*, White will make thickness with 2 and 4. Because of this thickness, after Black defends with 5, White 6 will be a strong attack against the two black stones

in the upper right.

Crawling to Black 5 in *Dia. 3* is also an important move. If Black jumps to 1 in *Dia. 5*, White will cut through with 2 and 4, then capture three stones with 6 and 8.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

The joseki starting with Black 1 in *Dia. 3* is played quite often in professional games. However, Black can use it to great advantage in handicap games as well. *Dia. 6* shows how effective it can be in a six-stone handicap game. After Black 13, White plays 14, building influence throughout the board. However, Black reinforces his position on the lower left; White can't put his influence to much use.




Dia. 7

After Black 3 in *Dia. 6*, White might gingerly switch to the upper right corner and approach with 1 in *Dia. 7*. In this case, Black will stabilize his position at the top with the pincer of 2. The sequence to Black 8 shows a typical continuation. Black has built a moyo at the top and he will aim to attack the two white stones in the upper right. Black 8 at 'a' would also be a good move.



Dia. 8

In the four-stone game in *Dia. 8*, a 5-dan amateur got off to a good start against Kato Masao 9-dan by using this joseki.




Dia. 9


Dia. 9 show a three-stone handicap game. This time in answer to the knight's move of Black 3, White approaches at 4 and Black pincers with 5 (as in *Dia. 7*). After the sequence 29, Black has secured territory at the top. White's stones there are insecure and he has failed to make any territory.

After the joseki in *Dia. 3*, White's stones are thin, and he must think about strengthening them. When this joseki was first played in pro-

fessional games, White 1 in *Dia. 10* was the first move tried, but it is a bit dull.




Dia. 10




Dia. 11

Since White 'a' in *Dia. 11* is not very effective, an invasion at the 3-3 point with 1 was experimented with. After White 7 —



Dia. 12

Black might wedge in with 1 in *Dia. 12*. In this case, White would sacrifice his two marked stones and build a thick position in the center. Black's territory at the top is not really that big, and White has sente after Black 7, so he can take profit elsewhere to compensate for the loss of his two stones.




Dia. 13

Dia. 13 is a game between two professionals. Without exchanging 'a' for Black 'b',


White invaded the corner with 1. This showed good judgment. After White 7, wedging in with 'c' is small, so Black took the big point at 8.

Dia. 14 shows another professional game. This time Black blocked on the right with 4 in answer to White 3. This was an interesting variation.




Dia. 14

After White 8 in *Dia. 15*, Black may choose not to defend the top. Instead, he wedges in with 9 and plays the sequence to 13. This has become a new joseki.



Dia. 15


Still, the corner is open to an invasion at the 3-3 point as the sequence to White 5 in *Dia. 16* shows.




Dia. 16

Black need not worry about the attachment of White 1 in *Dia. 17*. Black can push up with 2, then defend at 4. After White covers his defect at 5, Black reinforces his left side with 6.

After White's extension with the marked stone, turning at Black 1 in *Dia. 18* was a move invented by Yuki Satoshi 9-dan.




Dia. 17




Dia. 18

Yuki first played this move against Takemiya Masaki 9-dan. Takemiya was probably surprised by it, but he got a good position with the sequence to White 17 in *Dia. 19*. Yuki's new move caused a bit of a sensation.




Dia. 19

If White has the marked stone in place in the upper left corner in *Dia. 20*, after Black plays the marked stone, he can force Black to crawl along the third line with the sequence to 6. After 7, White's position is very thick.




Dia. 20

White must not go for territory by blocking with 1 in *Dia. 21*. Black would cut through with 2 and 4. After Black 10, White has a defect at 'a'; now, instead of thickness, he has bad aji.




Dia. 21

After White 7 in *Dia. 20*, Black must do something about White's thickness. Black 1 in *Dia. 22* seems to be the appropriate point.




Dia. 22

Dia. 23 shows an example of this joseki played in a professional game.




Dia. 23

Dia. 24 is a game between two amateurs. In this game, the marked black and white stones were exchanged. White slid to 1, but this was a slack move because it allowed Black to take sente with 2. With 4, Black began building a huge moyo in the upper left.




Dia. 24

In response to the marked white stone, Black can also attach at 1 in *Dia. 25*. White must answer this move. There are two standard responses: White 'a' and White 'b'.




Dia. 25



Dia. 26


In answer to the marked stone, White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 26* are bad moves; they only make Black's territory in the corner absolutely secure.

Descending to White 1 in *Dia. 27* is the correct move. Again the sequence to Black 10 is a joseki.




Dia. 27

White can also answer by blocking at 1 in *Dia. 28*. After this, the sequence to White 5 is a joseki. It is also possible for Black to omit the exchange of 4 for White 5. That enables Black to keep the option of playing at 5 in reserve.




Dia. 28

The result in *Dia. 28* is even. Black maps out territory in the corner and White gets a thick position at the top. Before attaching at 1 in *Dia. 25*, Black should have established a position in the upper left corner. For instance, if he has the marked stone in place in *Dia. 29*, Black can make a small knight's enclosure with 1. This move neutralizes White's thickness. A large knight's enclosure to 'a' would be an overplay because it is loose in defending the corner.




Dia. 29

If White already had the marked stone in place in *Dia. 30*, Black would not attach with 1 in *Dia. 25* because White's position in the top left would be too good for Black to allow.




Dia. 30

Black 1 in *Dia. 31* is the vital point in this position. This is where Black will aim to play in the future. Capturing the marked stone with White 2 is the best response. After Black 3, White will switch to another big point on the board.




Dia. 31

On the other hand, Black's corner is not completely secure. White can later aim to peep at 1 in *Dia. 32*. Black has no choice but to connect at 2, and White can live on the right by playing at 3.



Dia. 32

If Black defends the corner against the marked white stone by blocking at 1 in *Dia. 33*, White will cut at 2, then force with 4. Now White plays 6, confining Black to the corner and isolating the marked black stone. This result is too good for Black to allow. That is why he must connect at 2 in *Dia. 32*.



Dia. 33

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